

Lecture III

June 7, 2016

Structure of this Lecture

- ▶ ASP and FO(.) compared: the informal semantics
- ▶ ASP and FO(.) compared: examples
- ▶ Lazy model expansion: interleaving grounding with search

ASP and FO(.) compared

ASP and FO(.) compared in examples

Lazy model expansion: interleaving grounding with search

Conclusion

- ▶ What do LP's and ASP's language constructs mean?
 - ▶ negation as failure
 - ▶ rule operator
 - ▶ disjunction in the head
 - ▶ explicit negation
- ▶ A problem started in 1975
- ▶ These are problems of **informal semantics**
 - ▶ Can we find a precise informal explanation of programs, that explains the conclusions made by solvers
- ▶ Unresolved, I believe

±1990: ASP is Autoepistemic/Default reasoning

Example: Grant policy

- ▶ Every student for whom **we do not know whether** he is eligible for grant will be interviewed.



$Interview(x) \leftarrow \text{not } Eligible(x), \text{not } \neg Eligible(x).$

Informal semantics (G&L)	
not	= “I don’t know that”
\leftarrow	= material implication



Every x for which I don’t know that x is eligible and I don’t know that x is not eligible is to be interviewed.

This view explained:

- ▶ The program is the theory of a **rational introspective agent**
 - ▶ The theory is all he knows
- ▶ A stable model represents a **possible belief state**
 - ▶ More precisely: the set of literals believed in this belief state
- ▶ Backed up by mappings to autoepistemic logic (Moore 85) and Default Logic (Reiter 80)

$$\begin{array}{ccc} P \leftarrow Q, \text{not } R & & \\ \downarrow & & \\ Q \wedge \neg K(R) \Rightarrow P & \frac{Q:\neg R}{P} & . \end{array}$$

it is consistent (according to my theory) that $\neg R$ is true
it is consistent to assume that $\neg R$ is true
I do not know R

± 2000 - now: Search problems

Using ASP for encoding search problems

- ⇒ new language constructs
- ⇒ new methodology: GDT-programs
(Generate-Define-Test methodology — [Lifschitz 2002])

Hamiltonian cycle in ASP

GENERATE	$\{Path(x, y)\} \leftarrow Edge(x, y).$
DEFINE	$Node(V). \dots Node(W).$
	$Edge(A_1, A_2). \dots Edge(A_{n-1}, A_n).$
	$T(x, y) \leftarrow Path(x, y).$
	$T(x, y) \leftarrow T(x, z), T(z, y).$
TEST	$\leftarrow Path(x, y), Path(x, z), y \neq z.$
	$\leftarrow Path(x, z), Path(y, z), x \neq y.$
	$\leftarrow Node(x), Node(y), \text{not } T(x, y).$

Hamiltonian cycle in FO(.)

GENERATE	$\forall x \forall y (Path(x, y) \Rightarrow Edge(x, y)).$
DEFINE	$\frac{\{Node(V). \dots Node(W).\}}{\{Edge(A_1, A_2). \dots Edge(A_{n-1}, A_n).\}}$ $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \forall x \forall y \ T(x, y) \leftarrow Path(x, y). \\ \forall x \forall y \ T(x, y) \leftarrow T(x, z) \wedge T(z, y). \end{array} \right\}$
TEST	$\frac{\forall x \forall y \forall z \ Path(x, y) \wedge Path(x, z) \Rightarrow y = z.}{\forall x \forall y \forall z \ Path(x, z) \wedge Path(y, z) \Rightarrow x = y.}$ $\forall x \forall y \ Node(x) \wedge Node(y) \Rightarrow T(x, y).$

- ▶ The epistemic informal semantics was never satisfactory extended to full ASP?
 - ▶ Constraints, choice rules
 - ▶ $\leftarrow \text{Node}(x), \text{Node}(y), \text{not } T(x, y).$
"There is no x and y such that I believe that x and y are vertices and I do not know $(x, y) \in T$?"
- ▶ Answer sets semantics de facto was interpreted as a possible world semantics
 - ▶ An answer set represents a possible state of affairs (as everywhere else in logic and science)
- ▶ Terminology was not adapted
- ▶ The influence on the meaning of **not** and \leftarrow not investigated?

Hamiltonian cycle in ASP

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Informal semantics of GDT-programs

$$\{Path(x, y)\} \leftarrow Edge(x, y).$$

versus

$$\forall x \forall y (Path(x, y) \Rightarrow Edge(x, y)).$$

Global versus local closure

- ▶ ASP: global closure of all predicates
 - ▶ *Path* is closed unless opened by ... choice rule or whatever
- ▶ FO(.): definitions act as local closure of the defined predicates.
 - ▶ *Path* is open and the only predicate without a definition. So, all other predicates are closed.

Informal semantics of GDT-programs

DEFINE $Node(V_1). \dots$
 $\frac{Edge(A_1, A_2). \dots \dots \dots}{T(x, y) \leftarrow Path(x, y).}$
 $T(x, y) \leftarrow T(x, z), T(z, y).$

What information is encoded here?

- ▶ Definitions
- ▶ Definitions include negative information

Informal semantics of GDT-programs

TEST ...
 $\leftarrow \text{Node}(x), \text{Node}(y), \text{not } T(x, y).$

What information is encoded here?

- ▶ Every pair of nodes is connected.
- ▶ $\forall x \forall y (\text{Node}(x) \wedge \text{Node}(y) \Rightarrow T(x, y)).$

What does this mean according to ASP's informal semantics?

- ▶ x, y known to be nodes, I know they are connected.

Marc Denecker, Yuliya Lierler, Mirosław Truszczyński, Joost Vennekens: A Tarskian Informal Semantics for Answer Set Programming. ICLP (Technical Communications) 2012: 277-289

There is definitely a difference

$$\Pi = \{P \leftarrow \text{not } Q\}$$

- ▶ ASP, originally: P if I do not know Q (and this is all I know)
- ▶ LP as defs: P is defined to be not Q and Q is false (implicitly) (and this is all I know)
- ▶ FO(.): P is defined to be not Q (and this is all I know)

Three different meanings.

- ▶ Possible world semantics immediately reveals the difference.

- ▶ Currently, negation as failure **not** in ASP is still called called **default negation**
- ▶ I suspect, not because it has a different informal meaning than classical negation
- ▶ But because this is the "default" value of every atom:
 - ▶ an atom is false unless it has support
 - ▶ there is no support for deriving falsity of the literal.
- ▶ But this does not mean that **not** φ is $\neg K\varphi$ from AEL or DL.

The same behavior of negation can be found also in definitions, where it is definitely not epistemic negation

We define $\mathfrak{A} \models \varphi$ by induction on the structure ...:

- ▶ ...
- ▶ $\mathfrak{A} \models \neg\alpha$ if $\mathfrak{A} \not\models \alpha$
(i.e., it is not the case that $\mathfrak{A} \models \alpha$).



$$\Delta \models = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \forall i \forall p (Sat(i, p) \leftarrow Atom(p) \wedge In(p, i)) \\ \forall i \forall f \forall g (Sat(i, And(f, g)) \leftarrow Sat(i, f) \wedge Sat(i, g)) \\ \forall i \forall f \forall g (Sat(i, Or(f, g)) \leftarrow Sat(i, f) \vee Sat(i, g)) \\ \forall i \forall f (Sat(i, Not(f)) \leftarrow \neg Sat(i, f)) \end{array} \right\}$$

- ▶ I define that a person is **dead** if he is **not** alive.
- ▶ I define that a person is **dead** if **I do not know** that he is alive.

Do a possible world analysis.

ASP and FO(.) compared

ASP and FO(.) compared in examples

Lazy model expansion: interleaving grounding with search

Conclusion

Confer the IDP webpage

https:

[//dtai.cs.kuleuven.be/software/idp/ASPComparison](https://dtai.cs.kuleuven.be/software/idp/ASPComparison)

This webpage contains a comparison of 4 different applications from the ASP competition 2013.

- ▶ N01 - Permutation Pattern Matching
- ▶ N06 - Bottle Filling Problem
- ▶ N07 - Nomystery
- ▶ N12 - Strategic Companies

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[`https://people.cs.kuleuven.be/~bart.bogaerts/presentations/src/2014/LazyGrounding.html#/`](https://people.cs.kuleuven.be/~bart.bogaerts/presentations/src/2014/LazyGrounding.html#/)

- ▶ Slides of invited talk at LaSh2014, given by Bart Bogaerts
- ▶ Based on the paper:

Broes de Cat, Marc Denecker, Peter J. Stuckey, Maurice Bruynooghe: Lazy Model Expansion: Interleaving Grounding with Search. J. Artif. Intell. Res. (JAIR) 52: 235-286 (2015)

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Conclusion

The view of knowledge representation:

- ▶ formalizing "information"

The view of knowledge representation language:

- ▶ a formal language,
 - ▶ formal syntax
 - ▶ formal semantics
- ▶ a theory of informal semantics:
 - ▶ a general theory of what information is expressed by formal expressions of the logic

If so, a logic is a **formal, exact scientific theory** of the informal meaning of the language constructs that it contains.

- ▶ E.g., $\wedge, \vee, \neg, \forall, \exists, \Rightarrow, \Leftrightarrow$ in FO.
- ▶ Aggregates
- ▶ Definitions

The plan:

- ▶ building logics with language constructs derived from the language used in formal science and mathematics.
- ▶ Formal **possible world semantics**:
 - ▶ Structures are abstractions of potential states of affairs.
 - ▶ A mathematical theory formalizing the value of formal expressions in structures
 - ▶ **Models** = abstractions of **possible** states of affairs
 - ▶ Non-models = abstractions of **impossible** states of affairs.
- ▶ Simulates the methods of formal science (confer Newtons gravitation theory)

A refutable theory

- ▶ the informal semantics of an $\text{FO}(\cdot)$ theory is a mathematical theory
- ▶ We can compare the two and analyse whether they express the same
- ▶ As such, every theory is an **experiment** that can **refute** or **corroborate** the theory

We define $\mathfrak{A} \models \varphi$ by induction on the structure ...:

- ▶ ...
- ▶ $\mathfrak{A} \models \neg\alpha$ if $\mathfrak{A} \not\models \alpha$
(i.e., it is not the case that $\mathfrak{A} \models \alpha$).

\Downarrow

$$\Delta \models = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \forall i \forall p (Sat(i, p) \leftarrow Atom(p) \wedge In(p, i)) \\ \forall i \forall f \forall g (Sat(i, And(f, g)) \leftarrow Sat(i, f) \wedge Sat(i, g)) \\ \forall i \forall f \forall g (Sat(i, Or(f, g)) \leftarrow Sat(i, f) \vee Sat(i, g)) \\ \forall i \forall f (Sat(i, Not(f)) \leftarrow \neg Sat(i, f)) \end{array} \right\}$$

The experiment:

- ▶ Use FO's informal semantics theory to verify mathematically that the formal definition "reads" as the definition
- ▶ Compare *Sat* in the well-founded model with the defined relation.